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INDIFFERENCE AND SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Richard G. Kunkel†
Online infringements of copyright have been rampant for
decades and shows no signs of abating. Owners of copyrighted films,
music and books have attempted to hold infringers liable, but the
expense of enforcing their rights against individual infringers is
prohibitive. A more effective method of preventing infringement is to
attempt to hold online intermediaries, such as Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), secondarily liable for the primary infringements of
their subscribers. Theories of contributory infringement, vicarious
liability and inducement liability all rely on affirmative acts by
intermediaries that facilitate infringement by others. In Roadshow
Films Pty Limited v iiNet Limited, the Australian High Court
considered whether an ISP’s indifference to primary infringements by
its subscribers would make the ISP secondarily liable for
“authorising” the infringements under Australia’s Copyright Act.
The High Court unanimously ruled that the ISP was not secondarily
liable for its indifference – despite knowing of specific acts of
infringement and having ongoing control over its users’ accounts.
The decision has important legal and public policy implications for
secondary liability for Internet intermediaries in Australia and
worldwide. The High Court decision and its ramifications are
discussed in this article.
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INTRODUCTION
The owners of valuable copyrights in digitized music, films,
books and software have been battling the scourge of copyright
1
infringement around the globe for over two decades. A variety of
legislative, judicial and policy initiatives have barely made an impact
2
on the extent of copyright infringement occurring globally. Internet
intermediaries, such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), peer-to-peer
networks, user-generated content platforms and technology providers

1. See e.g., REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFTWARE LITIGATION
(2011) [hereinafter GIBLIN, CODE WARS]; Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL 1, 4-18 (Joe Karaganis, ed.,
2011), http://bit.do/MediaPiracy.
2. See e.g., Ted Johnson, Producers’ Coalition Says Copyright Alert System Has Failed
to Stop Piracy, in VARIETY (May 12, 2015); Rebecca Giblin, Evaluating Graduated Response,
37 COLUM. J. L. & THE ARTS 147 (2014) [hereinafter Giblin, Graduated Response]; France
Ends Three-Strikes Internet Piracy Ban Policy, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (July
10, 2014), http://bit.do/FranceEndsBanPolicy; David Price, Sizing the Piracy Universe,
NETNAMES (Sept. 2013), http://bit.do/NetNamesPiracy.
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enable copyright infringement on such a large scale that lawsuits
3
against individuals for direct infringement is impracticable.
Copyright owners’ only practical alternative is to attempt to hold
4
intermediaries liable under a theory of secondary liability. Secondary
5
liability theories include contributory infringement, vicarious
6
7
liability and inducement liability.
ISPs could play an important role in preventing online piracy of
digital copyright works. ISPs have the technological capability to
control traffic flowing through their networks. They also have control
over the terms of service that govern their ongoing relationship with
their customers. It is economically efficient for ISPs to use these
technical and contractual control measures to prevent, or at least
8
impede, their subscribers’ infringing conduct online. In recent years,
copyright owners have sought to compel ISPs to engage in the battle
9
against online copyright infringement by their subscribers. ISPs are
attractive targets for secondary liability lawsuits because they are
10
easily identifiable gatekeepers with deep pockets. ISPs and other
intermediaries understandably wish to avoid the cost of, and potential
liability for, detecting and deterring infringing conduct online. ISPs
obviously prefer to have no affirmative legal duties to actively
monitor their users’ conduct to deter copyright infringement by
subscribers.
Several countries, including France and the United Kingdom,
have enacted legislation to impose on ISPs an affirmative duty to act
against online copyright infringement through “graduated response”
3. Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual Property
Rights Infringement, 45 AM. BUS. L. J. 247, 254 (2008).
4. Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service
Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 25 (2006) (discussing
MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005). Professor Elkin-Koren has termed this an
“enforcement failure,” which leads to under-deterrence of copyright infringement.).
5. Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
6. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); see
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Cal.
1995).
7. MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
8. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 256–59 (2006); David Lindsay, Liability of ISPs for End-User
Copyright Infringements: The First Instance Decision in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet (No
3), 60(2) TELECOMM. J. OF AUSTL. 29.1, 29.17-18 (2010).
9. Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: ‘Six Strikes’ Measured
Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1, 10-16 (2012) (a global
campaign to enlist ISPs to implement a program of warnings and sanctions against their
infringing subscribers began as early as 2005).
10. Elkin-Koren, supra note 4, at 26.
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schemes. In general, when copyright owners detect copyright
infringement online and send a notice to an ISP, these regimes require
ISPs to warn their infringing subscribers to stop their illegal activity.
If the subscriber continues to infringe, increasing levels of sanctions
12
will typically be applied. Other nations, such as Germany, have
13
refused to enact graduated response legislation. In the United States,
copyright owners marshaled sufficient political pressure and threats
of litigation to persuade some major ISPs to “voluntarily” implement
14
a graduated response program even without national legislation.
In the absence of a new graduated response scheme, whether
imposed by legislation or negotiated agreement, copyright owners
have striven to establish secondary liability for ISPs through litigation
under existing copyright laws. However, ISPs have not yet been held
secondarily liable for their subscribers’ infringing acts if the ISP
merely remains indifferent to infringement and fails to take action to
stop it. In the absence of an affirmative legal duty, intermediaries
could remain indifferent to infringement.
Indifference to rampant online copyright infringement was
arguably justifiable when ISPs often had only general knowledge that
their networks and services were used for a variety of illegal purposes
along with legal and legitimate uses. Further, indifference may be
defensible if an ISP lacks sufficient control over its subscribers’ use
of its network. For example, in cases involving devices that facilitated
reproductions of infringing copyright material, the device
manufacturers had no control over the purchasers’ use of the device
15
after the sale, whether for infringing or legitimate uses. Secondary

11. Giblin, Graduated Response, supra note 2, at 153-73. These countries include France,
New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., United Kingdom Digital Economy Act 2010 (UK); New Zealand - (Copyright (Infringing File Sharing)
Amendment Act 2011 (NZ); France - (Loi 2009-1311 du 28 octobre 2009 relative à la protection
pénale de la propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet arts 6 and 7, 251 Journal Officiel de la
République Française, 29 October 2009).
12. See Giblin, Graduated Response, supra note 2, at 153-73 (Some of these graduated
response schemes initially included suspension or termination of Internet service as a sanction.).
13. Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2010)
(Graduated response schemes were rejected by Germany, Hong Kong, Spain, and Sweden as
well as in the European Parliament.).
14. Bridy, supra note 9, at 11-12; Memorandum of Understanding between content
owner representatives, the participating ISPs, and the members of the Participating Content
Owners Group (July 6, 2011), http://bit.do/CopyrightMOU.
15. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 (UK); Australian Tape
Manufacturers Association Ltd and Others v The Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 177 CLR
480.
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liability based on indifference has not been imposed on third parties
where this element of control is absent.
Changes in the online environment may be increasing the risk
that ISPs will be held secondarily liable if they persist in their
indifference to copyright infringement. Online infringing activity can
be tracked and documented. In recent years copyright owners have
undertaken their own monitoring and detection activities that enable
them to provide ISPs with specific identifying information regarding
16
the infringing acts of subscribers on specific ISP networks. Today,
online intermediaries provide services that enable infringement rather
than devices. These services are delivered pursuant to ongoing
contractual relationships. ISPs can modify the contract terms from
time to time to exert control over their users’ online activities.
Content owners argue that the combination of this knowledge of
specific acts of infringement and the ISP’s control over their service
are sufficient to create an affirmative legal duty to take action to
combat infringement. If this duty were to be legally recognized, ISPs
would be secondarily liable if they were indifferent to copyright
infringement and refused to act. Litigation in Australia sought to
establish secondary liability for an ISP’s indifference to widespread
copyright infringement by its subscribers.
17
Piracy has been a persistent problem in Australia. Graduated
18
response legislation has not yet been enacted there. Instead,
copyright owners and ISPs have for years attempted to negotiate a
voluntary industry code of practice similar to graduated response
19
schemes implemented in other countries.
In 2007, lengthy
negotiations between major copyright owners and ISPs failed to
20
produce an agreement for a voluntary graduated response scheme.
16. The Copyright Alert System in the United States hired a vendor, Mark Monitor, to
monitor peer to peer (P2P) traffic to generate infringement notices. The system sent 1.3 million
notices in its first year. CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION, THE COPYRIGHT ALERT
SYSTEM PHASE ONE AND BEYOND 1, 6 (May 28, 2014), http://bit.do/CopyrightAlertSystem.
17. Marc C. Scott, From Convicts to Pirates: Australia’s Dubious Legacy of
Illegal Downloading, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 10, 2015), http://bit.do/ConvictsToPirates.
18. AUSTRALIAN ATTORNEY GENERAL JOINT MEDIA RELEASE, COLLABORATION TO
TACKLE ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://bit.do/CollabToTackle (In
the past year, the Australian Attorney General and Communications Minister pressured ISPs to
reach agreement on an industry code of practice by threatening to impose one unilaterally if
negotiations were unsuccessful. While a draft code was prepared, implementation has been
delayed due to inability to agree on which parties will bear the costs of the system.); Allie
Coyne, Australia’s Industry Piracy Code Still Stuck On Cost Debate, ITNEWS (Jul. 22, 2015),
http://bit.do/AustlPiracyStuck.
19. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AH(1) (Austl.). (Development of an industry code
was provided for in the ISP safe harbour provisions of Australian Copyright Act.).
20. See Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2011) 194 FCR 285 (Austl.) [hereinafter,
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In response, a consortium of movie studios filed suit seeking to
establish the secondary liability of ISPs for the direct infringement of
their subscribers.
The Australian Copyright Act 1968 provides for a statutory tort
imposing secondary liability on those who “authorise” primary
21
infringements by others.
Case law precedents had broadly
interpreted authorisation liability under the Copyright Act, making
Australia a favorable jurisdiction for testing the limits of secondary
22
liability for ISPs based on indifference. Under these precedents,
indifference to known online infringement appeared to be sufficient to
hold an ISP secondarily liable for copyright infringement. In 2009, a
consortium of movie studios pursued litigation against iiNet, a large
Australian ISP, as a means to either: 1) increase legal pressure upon
ISPs to agree to a graduated response program via an industry code,
or 2) to establish by judicial precedent that ISPs face authorisation
liability if they are indifferent to copyright infringement on their
networks.
Thousands of iiNet subscribers had committed primary
infringements of the movie studios’ copyrights by downloading
movies using the BitTorrent peer-to-peer software. The studios
provided iiNet with detailed information regarding the infringing
23
acts. The studios’ lawsuit asserted that this knowledge of specific
infringing downloads, along with iiNet’s technical and contractual
control over its subscribers, created an affirmative legal duty to
prevent these infringements. They argued that iiNet authorised these
infringements not by action, but by indifference, and by failing to take
action to prevent them. iiNet prevailed in both the Federal trial
24
25
court, and on appeal at the Full Federal Court. In Roadshow Films
26
Pty Limited v iiNet Limited, the Australian High Court rejected the
studios’ claims of secondary liability by indifference in a 5-0
unanimous decision. The court held that iiNet’s indifference had not
IINET

APPELLATE JUDGMENT], 348-49 (Jagot, J) for background on the industry code and these
failed negotiations.
21. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1) (Austl.). (This article will use the Australian
spellings “authorise” and “authorisation” as used in the Copyright Act and in Australian case
law. Citations to Australian cases and statutes also follow Australian citation formats.).
22. GIBLIN, CODE WARS, supra note 1, at 119-41.
23. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2010) FCA 24 (Austl.) [hereinafter, IINET TRIAL
JUDGMENT] ¶96-104 (For fifty-nine weeks in 2008 and 2009, extensive spreadsheets detailing
the infringing downloads were sent to iiNet.).
24. Id. at ¶635.
25. IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20.
26. Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd (2012) 248 CLR 42 (Austl.) [hereinafter, IINET
HIGH COURT JUDGMENT].
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authorised its subscribers’ illegal downloading activities and that
27
iiNet was not secondarily liable.
In iiNet, the High Court refused to impose a broad duty upon
ISPs requiring them to act affirmatively to deter infringements by
their subscribers. The High Court disapproved of established
precedents that had used a broad test for authorisation: that one
“authorises” a primary infringement by another person if they
28
“sanction, approve or countenance” the infringement. Instead, the
court revived an older and narrower construction of “authorisation.”
Under the High Court’s ruling in iiNet, an authoriser’s actions must
demonstrate an intention to “grant or purport to grant” a third person
29
the right to do the infringing act. The High Court’s ruling makes it
very difficult to establish a case of authorisation liability based on an
ISP’s indifference alone. Affirmative conduct in relation to the
primary infringements is required. In addition, the High Court
directed the copyright owners to Parliament to seek legislation
30
creating expanded duties for ISPs.
This article will consider the High Court decision in iiNet and its
implications for secondary liability in Australia and worldwide. The
iiNet decision likely will have an impact internationally as other
countries consider graduated response schemes that would require
Internet intermediaries to monitor, detect and sanction infringing acts
by their subscribers. Part I reviews the factual and legal background
of the iiNet case. Part II reviews the history and development of
authorisation law principles in Australia. Part III analyzes the main
principles and legal reasoning of the High Court judgment in the iiNet
case. Part IV will discuss the impact of the iiNet decision on
secondary liability in Australia, and the public policy decisions
surrounding graduated response proposals.
I. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF ROADSHOW FILMS PTY
LIMITED V IINET LIMITED
Thirty-four major motion picture studios located in Australia and
the United States sued iiNet claiming that iiNet was secondarily liable
for authorising the copyright infringement committed by its

27. Id.
28. Id. at 62-63; Id. at 85, 89 (discussing the holding in University of New South Wales v
Moorhouse & Angus & Robertson (Publishers) Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 1 (Austl.)).
29. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 61, 84-85 (discussing the holding in
Falcon v Famous Players Film Co. (1982) 2 KB 474 (Atkin, LJ) (UK)).
30. Id. at 71 (French, J), and at 82 (Gummow, J).

8

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 33

31

subscribers. The studios had formed an industry association known
32
as the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft (AFACT).
AFACT acted on behalf of its membership to investigate online
copyright infringement and to engage in activities to discourage
infringements.
At the time, iiNet Limited was the third-largest Internet service
provider in Australia. Like many technology startups, iiNet
commenced operations in a garage in 1993. iiNet was listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange in 1999, when it had fewer than 20,000
33
subscribers. iiNet enjoyed rapid and sustained growth, and grew to
become the second largest DSL broadband supplier in Australia. It
provided a broad range of Internet and technology services, and grew
34
to have more than 2500 employees and a market value in excess of
35
A$1.5 billion.
Online piracy of copyrighted material is an especially significant
36
problem in Australia for a variety of reasons. These include delayed
37
release of content already legally available overseas, differential
pricing charging Australians higher prices for legal digital content
38
available for less in other countries, and, until recently, lack of
39
available legal access to the most current and desirable content.
31. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶2.
32. Id. at ¶80-82 (AFACT was working closely with the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) in pursuing the litigation.); See Myles Peterson, Australia: U.S. Copyright
Colony, or Just a Good Friend (January 21, 2012) http://bit.do/CopyrightColony (The article
includes supporting links to Wikileaks.org. http://bit.do/PublicLibraryUSDiplomacy. The
AFACT
group
now
calls
itself
the
“Australian
Screen
Association”;
http://bit.do/AustlScreenAssoc.)
33. A timeline of milestone events in iiNet’s history is available at
http://bit.do/iiNetHistory.
34. iiNet Media Release, iiNet Gains Further International Plaudits (May 6, 2014),
http://bit.do/iiNetMediaRelease.
35. David Ramli & Tess Ingram, iiNet Shareholders Vote in Favour of TPG Telecom
Merger, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 27, 2015), http://bit.do/iiNetShareholderVote (iiNet
was sold to TPG Telecom for A$1.56 billion in July, 2015).
36. Freya Noble & Heather McNab, House of Thieves: How Australians Have Become
the World’s Worst Internet Pirates... Ripping Off the Final Season of House of Cards Far More
Than
Any
Other
Country,
DAILY
MAIL
AUSTRALIA
(Mar.
2,
2015),
http://bit.do/AustlWorstPirates; Michael Idato, House of Cards Season 3 Piracy Booms in
Countries Without Netflix, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (March 2, 2015),
http://bit.do/HouseofCardsPiracy; Bernard Zuel, Australians World’s Worst for Illegal Music
Downloads, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 19, 2012), http://bit.do/AustlWorstIllegalMusic.
37. Nick Evershed, Australian Film Industry Claims Delayed Release Is Rare but Data
Shows Otherwise (June 30, 2014), http://bit.do/AustlDelayedRelease.
38. HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS, AT
WHAT
COST?
IT
PRICING
AND
THE
AUSTRALIA
TAX
(July
2013),
http://bit.do/HouseOfRepITPricing.
39. Marc Moncrief, Stan, Netflix, Presto: Is Streaming the End of Piracy? SYDNEY
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When the 2009 litigation began, the movie studios were aware of
studies showing that 57% of all Internet traffic in Australia in 2007
was peer-to-peer file transfers, and 73% of that traffic involved the
40
BitTorrent protocol. More than half of the traffic on iiNet’s network
represented uploads and downloads using peer-to-peer software,
41
primarily BitTorrent. It is widely understood that a substantial
portion BitTorrent traffic infringes copyrighted materials.
The movie studios hired DTecNet, an Internet-surveillance firm,
to monitor public peer-to-peer networks for infringing activity.
DTecNet used a thorough process to identify the IP addresses of iiNet
users who committed primary infringements of the studios’ films by
42
sharing or downloading the films using BitTorrent. DTecNet
compiled this identifying information into spreadsheets cataloging
and summarizing the infringing conduct of iiNet users and forwarded
it to AFACT. Acting on behalf of the studios, AFACT supplied iiNet
with messages entitled “Notice of Infringement of Copyright” each
week for fifty-nine weeks in 2008 and 2009 (the “AFACT Notices”).
43
The AFACT Notices identified the IP addresses of those iiNet users
who were shown by DTecNet data to be “repeat infringers,” i.e. those
who had made multiple infringing downloads. The letters “required”
44
that iiNet take unspecified actions to prevent further infringements.
The implication was that iiNet should undertake an unspecified type
of graduated response program. Importantly, the AFACT notices
contained no information regarding the methods used to obtain the
identifying information or to confirm that the files contained
45
copyrighted films.

MORNING HERALD (Sept. 4, 2015), http://bit.do/StreamingEndtoPrivacy.
40. Internet Study 2007, IPOQUE (2007), http://bit.do/Ipoque2007.
41. See IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 379, 383 (Jagot, J) (The full
Federal Court referred to this fact several times).
42. See IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶113. (DTecNet used a customized
version of BitTorrent client software to identify the digital files of copyrighted films being
shared online. DTecNet downloaded one copy of each suspected file, viewed the file to confirm
that it was a film under the studios’ copyright, and identified the IP addresses of the BitTorrent
users sharing the file containing film. Next, DTecNet used a filter to identify only those users
who had IP addresses issued by iiNet’s service. Finally, DTecNet created a detailed daily log of
information about the files exchanged by iiNet users containing the studios’ copyrighted works,
the relevant IP addresses of iiNet users and other detailed identifying information. This
investigation produced an extremely detailed inventory of the alleged primary infringements by
iiNet users.).
43. Id. at ¶96-104.
44. Id. at ¶98 (The trial judge, Cowdroy J, concluded from other evidence that AFACT
wanted iiNet to initiate a graduated response scheme to warn, suspend or terminate users, which
AFACT had been negotiating with the Internet Industry Association.); Id. at ¶440.
45. Id. supra note 23, at ¶79-154, ¶468-69.
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In response, iiNet did nothing to identify the accounts of
infringing subscribers or to take measures against them. The process
of identifying individual subscribers from the IP address data was
complex and expensive, and iiNet was unwilling to incur the costs
46
based on unverified allegations of infringement.
iiNet also
determined that it could not make the complex legal determination
necessary to determine whether copyright infringement had actually
occurred, even though the identifying information was quite detailed.
iiNet did not learn the details of the DTecNet surveillance methods
until the court proceedings began. Only then did Michael Malone,
iiNet’s founder and managing director, concede at trial that the
47
DTecNet evidence was “compelling.” Even so, he maintained that
claims of infringement had to be evaluated by an independent third
48
party before moving from allegation to punishment. iiNet chose to
take no action until AFACT’s claims of primary infringement were
tested and proven in court.
When iiNet failed to implement a form of graduated response
against its subscribers as AFACT had sought, the movie studios sued.
The studios claimed that iiNet subscribers had engaged in primary
copyright infringement under the Copyright Act by making copies of
the studios’ films, by making the films available online and by
electronically transmitting the films using the BitTorrent peer-to-peer
49
software protocol. Most importantly, the studios also claimed that
iiNet had authorised the subscribers’ primary infringements by
indifference based on two factors. They argued that iiNet had a legal
duty to act because: 1) the AFACT notices established that iiNet
knew specific infringements were occurring and were likely to
continue and 2) iiNet took no action against the primary infringers
(such as suspending or terminating their accounts) even though it had
the right to do so under the company’s Customer Relationship
Agreement (“CRA”) and had the technical ability to do so. The
50
studios sought monetary damages and injunctive relief.
iiNet contended that its action—or rather, its indifference and
lack of action—did not amount to authorisation of its subscribers’
infringements. Although a large portion of its traffic used BitTorrent,
such traffic could include either infringing or non-infringing content.
Thus, iiNet claimed that the AFACT notices were “mere allegations”
46. Id. at ¶27.
47. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶172-80.
48. Id. at ¶179.
49. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10 and s 86(c) (Austl.); IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra
note 23, at ¶266-69.
50. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶12-16.
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51

of infringement. iiNet lacked sufficient information to verify
whether the allegations were true or whether the contents truly were
infringing. iiNet asserted that it was not obligated to incur the
significant expenses necessary to take action against its subscribers
under the CRA until the studios’ claims of primary infringement were
proven in court. iiNet also argued that it had no control over the
BitTorrent protocol or the manner in which iiNet subscribers chose to
52
use it. Thus, it had no power to prevent the infringing acts.
II. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BY
AUTHORISATION IN AUSTRALIA
Australian law has recognized secondary liability for
53
“authorising” copyright infringement for more than 100 years. The
current language of the Copyright Act 1968, Section 101(1) is:
Subject to this Act, a copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part is
infringed by a person who, not being the owner of the copyright, and
without the licence of the owner of the copyright, does in Australia, or
authorises the doing in Australia of, any act comprised in the copyright.54

A century of legal interpretation regarding authorisation liability
has produced a body of law fraught with uncertainty and confusion.
Professor Giblin has observed: “Eminent commentators have
variously described it as ‘unclear,’ ‘hard to reconcile,’ ‘enshrouded’
in confusion, ‘incoherent,’ and ‘unnecessarily complex and
55
uncertain.’” The iiNet case is emblematic of this confusion: it
produced six separate judgments, each varying from the others in the
56
analysis and reasoning applied. This creates a very uncertain legal
environment for ISPs and other Internet intermediaries.

51. Id. at ¶27.
52. Id. at ¶17-31.
53. Copyright Act 1905 (Cth) s 13, s 14 and s 34 (Austl.). (Copyright Act 1912 (Cth)
(Austl.) adopted the Copyright Act 1911 (UK) into Australian law.).
54. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1) and s 13(2) (Austl.) (emphasis added).
55. Rebecca Giblin, The Uncertainties, Baby: Hidden Perils of Australia’s Authorisation
Law, 20 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 148, 149 (2009) [ hereinafter Giblin, Uncertainties]; (citing 6
Laddie H et al., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS (3rd ed., Butterworths,
London, 2000) 1772 at 39.14); Jennifer E. Stuckey, Liability for Authorizing Infringement of
Copyright, 7 UNSWLJ 77, 78 (1984); David Lindsay, Internet Intermediary Liability: A
Comparative Analysis In The Context Of The Digital Agenda Reforms, 1 & 2 COPYRIGHT
REPORTER 70, 77 (2006).
56. The six judgments are: the judgment of Cowdroy, J, at the trial court; the separate
judgments of Emmett, Jagot and Nicholas, JJ, at the Full Federal Court; and the judgments of
French CJ, Crennan and Keifel, JJ; and Gummow and Hayne, JJ, respectively, at the High
Court.
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The complexity and uncertainty arise from a number of factors.
First, case precedents have not been careful to distinguish between
liability for “authorising” infringement from a separate form of
57
liability for “permitting” public performances of works. Second, an
imprecisely-drafted statutory provision intending to partially codify
58
the law was added to the Copyright Act in 2001. While intended to
clarify the law and provided greater certainty to intermediaries, it has
59
had the opposite effect. Third, copyright infringement arises in a
host of contexts that necessarily involve case-specific issues of fact
that often involve matters of degree. This is particularly true when
authorization must be inferred from a failure to act or indifference to
the primary infringements. Consequently, case precedents often are
60
not easily applied to other cases and contexts.
A. A Splintered and Confused History
In 1912, Australia adopted the U.K’s Copyright Act 1911 (the
“Imperial Act”), which provided liability both for authorising
61
infringing copyright activities, as well as liability for permitting an
62
entertainment venue to be used for infringing public performances.
Courts in both the U.K. and Australia very quickly began to
commingle these two separate forms of secondary liability.
An early English case, Performing Right Society v. Ciryl
63
Syndicate construed the Imperial Act’s provisions for authorising an
infringement and for permitting a performance, based on the
defendant’s indifference and failure to act to prevent the
infringements. Professor Lindsay notes that the Ciryl court conflated
the reasoning regarding authorisation liability and the reasoning
64
regarding permitting a performance. In iiNet the High Court
observed that in Cyril the judgment of Bankes, LJ, treated these two

57. See infra section II.A.
58. Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth) (Austl.).
59. Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 155-61; David Lindsay, ISP Liability for EndUser Copyright Infringements: The High Court Decision in Roadshow Films v. iiNet, 62
TELECOMM. J. OF AUSTL. 53.1, 53.9-53.10 (2012).
60. University of New South Wales v Moorhouse & Angus & Robertson (Publishers) Pty
Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 1, 12 (Austl.) [hereinafter, Moorhouse] (Gibbs, J, observes: “The question
whether one person authorizes another to commit an infringement depends upon all the facts of
the case so that a decision on a particular set of circumstances may be of no assistance in other
cases.”).
61. Copyright Act of 1911 (Imp) s 1(2) (UK).
62. Copyright Act of 1911 (Imp) s 2(3) (UK).
63. Performing Right Society v Ciryl Syndicate [1924] 1 KB 1 (UK).
64. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.6 (2012).
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65

separate claims as synonymous. The Cyril case is important for
establishing the principle that indifference may reach a degree from
66
which either authorisation or permission may be inferred.
Soon, another English case, Falcon v Famous Players Film
67
Co., considered a situation in which some producers had imported a
film to England, where they contracted with a movie theatre owner
for the purpose of screening the film to the public. While the case
involved authorisation (not permission), it was based on the
affirmative acts of the producers, rather than on inaction or
indifference. Unfortunately, Falcon produced two formulations for
determining authorisation liability under the Imperial Act. The
narrower interpretation by Atkin, LJ, held that “to ‘authorise’ means
to grant or purport to grant to a third person the right to do the act
complained of, whether the intention is that the grantee shall do the
68
act on his own account, or only on account of the grantor.” Since
the producers obviously acted in a way that purported to grant the
movie theatre the right to screen the film, Atkin, LJ, held them liable
for authorising the infringement under this narrower test. Bankes, LJ,
adopted a broader view of authorisation based on synonyms in the
Oxford dictionary definition of “authorise”: “to sanction, approve,
69
countenance.” Under this broader test, Bankes, LJ, also held that the
producers’ affirmative acts had authorised infringement.
The Australian High Court embraced the “sanction, approve and
countenance” standard in Adelaide Corporation v Australasian
70
Performing Rights Association. The case involved permitting a
performance and was based on the indifference of the owner of a
performance hall. The owner of a hall leased it to a third party to be
used for the purpose of vocal concerts by a singer. The hall owner
failed to stop the performances despite being notified of the
likelihood that the concert would involve public performance of songs
infringing copyright. The hall owner’s indifference was obvious: it
65. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 78 (Gummow, J).
66. Performing Right Society v Ciryl Syndicate [1924] 1 KB 1 (UK), 10; See also The
Corporation of the City of Adelaide v The Australasian Performing Right Association Limited
(1928) 40 CLR 481, 504 [hereinafter, ADELAIDE CORPORATION].
67. Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co., [1926] 2 KB 474 (UK).
68. Id. at 499 (Atkin, LJ).
69. Id. at 491 (Bankes, LJ) (Even this formulation was later disputed. The original
expression of this definition is from Evans v E Hulton and Co Ltd [1924] 131 LT 534, 535 (UK)
(citing the Oxford Dictionary definition “to give formal approval to; sanction, approve,
countenance”). Some contend the definition is conjunctive (sanction, approve and countenance)
relying on Bankes LJ, in Falcon.) Others contend the definition is disjunctive (sanction, approve
or countenance) (relying on ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at 504 (Higgins, J)).
70. ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66.
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knew the offending songs were to be performed, and it ignored all
warnings of the impending infringement from rights holders.
As a permission case, the narrower test for determining
authorisation of Atkin LJ—grant or purport to grant—is not even
mentioned. Even so, Adelaide Corporation often has been cited in
subsequent authorisation cases for the holding by Higgins J, that
liability by indifference could not arise in the absence of a direct
power to prevent the specific infringing act, i.e. the singing of the
71
song. The court held that the hall owner did not permit the
infringing concert because it had no direct control or power over the
infringing vocal performance itself, but only an indirect power to
72
prevent it by terminating the entire lease.
73
In The University of New South Wales v Moorhouse, the
Australian High Court considered an authorisation case imposing
liability for facilitating infringements by indifference or failure to act.
The case involved a new reproduction technology—the
photocopier—that threatened to make copyright infringement of
books easy and inexpensive. The Australian Copyright Council
instigated a test case concerning the placement of coin-operated
photocopy machines in university libraries. A person selected a book
of short stories from the open shelves of a university library and made
two copies of a short story using the photocopiers provided by the
library. The case was designed to test whether the library authorised
the primary infringement by providing both the copyrighted books
74
and the photocopiers in public areas of the library.
Unfortunately, Moorhouse again split the law by introducing two
competing formulations, each of which was based on the broader
“sanction, approve, countenance” standard used in Falcon and
Adelaide Corporation. The majority decision of Jacobs, J, and
McTiernan, ACJ, described authorisation as an express or implied
75
“permission or invitation to do the acts comprised in the copyright.”
Jacobs, J, reasoned that the circumstances of the case—providing the
photocopiers along with open access to books in the library’s
collection—created the inference of an implied invitation to use the
photocopiers “as they saw fit,” which included infringing copying.
The university had not provided any copyright notices that limited use
of the copiers only for non-infringing purposes, so the invitation was
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 499.
Id. See also, IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 48 (French, J).
Moorhouse,, supra note 60.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 21 (Jacobs J, and McTeirnan ACJ, agreeing).
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unqualified. Further, because the circumstances created the inference,
the degree of the university’s knowledge about any actual infringing
acts was irrelevant. Professor Lindsay contends that this judgment
apparently assimilates the earlier precedents on authorisation and
76
permission.
The minority opinion by Gibbs J, applied the same “sanction,
approve, countenance” standard to reach a broader interpretation that
would impose authorisation liability for inactivity or indifference in
certain circumstances. First, he found that a person cannot authorise
an infringement of copyright unless he has some power to prevent
77
it. Next, he observed that express or formal permission or active
conduct indicating approval is not essential. “Inactivity or
indifference, exhibited by acts of commission or omission, may reach
a degree from which an authorisation or permission may be
78
inferred.” Gibbs, J, reasoned that if: 1) a person has control over the
means of infringement, 2) makes it available to others, 3) and knows
or has reason to suspect the infringing conduct, then a failure to act
(by taking reasonable steps to limit its use to legitimate purposes) will
79
result in authorisation. Professors Burrell and Weatherall note that
the Gibbs judgment may be read to have significantly broadened
authorisation liability to include cases in which the defendant merely
permitted the infringements provided some elements of knowledge
80
and control were present. The Moorhouse decision has been
criticized for being overly broad and introducing considerable
81
uncertainty into authorisation liability.
The Gibbs judgment’s broad interpretation of secondary
liability is a dangerous precedent for the many Internet intermediaries
who make available facilities, services or platforms that can be used
to facilitate copyright infringement. Like iiNet, these intermediaries
have ongoing relationships with their users. They exert contractual
control over their users in the terms of service governing the use of
their service. These terms can be updated as needed to respond to new
forms of infringing behavior. Under such a broad interpretation, the
76.
77.

Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.7.
Moorhouse,, supra note 60, at 12 (citing ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at
503).
Moorhouse,, supra note 60, at 12 (citing ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at

78.
504).
79. Moorhouse,, supra note 60, at 13.
80. Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall, Providing Services to Copyright Infringers:
Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 723, 732 (2011).
81. See Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 157; Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80,
at 730-32; (The Moorhouse standard was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH
Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 1 SCR 339 (Can.)).
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only remaining factor required for a finding of authorisation liability
is knowledge. Intermediaries would typically have general knowledge
of the likelihood of infringing activities by users. In the past, this
knowledge alone likely was insufficient to create an affirmative duty
for ISPs to act to prevent particular infringing acts. However, today
copyright owners are able to supply intermediaries with specific
knowledge of particular infringing acts by identifiable subscribers, as
occurred in iiNet. Just one message from an aggrieved rights holder
identifying specific infringements would create an affirmative duty
for intermediaries to actively monitor the behavior of subscribers and
others using the service. Under the broad interpretation of the Gibbs
judgment, intermediary indifference would trigger liability.
Moorhouse, and particularly the judgment of Gibbs, J,
interpreting the “sanction, approve, countenance” test, became the
leading Australian authorisation case. When digital entertainment
media became commonplace, copying technologies proliferated and
the emergence of the Internet enabled widespread infringements.
Australian courts applied Moorhouse, and particularly the Gibbs
82
judgment, in a wide range of authorisation cases.
B. An Enigmatic Statutory Intervention
Another source of confusion in Australian authorisation liability
is the partial codification of the case law that took effect in 2001. The
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, amended Section
101(1) by adding the following subsection:
(1A) In determining, for the purposes of subsection (1), whether or not a
person has authorised the doing in Australia of any act comprised in a
copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part without the licence of the owner
of the copyright, the matters that must be taken into account include the
following:
(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the
act concerned;
(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the
person who did the act concerned;
82. See, e.g., Australasian Performing Right Association Limited v Jain (1990) 26 FCR
53; Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd and Others v The Commonwealth of
Australia (1993) 177 CLR 480; Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Metro on
George Pty Ltd and Others (2004) 61 IPR 575; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v
Cooper and Others (2005) 150 FCR 1; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v
Sharman License Holdings Ltd and Others (2005) 65 IPR 289; Cooper v Universal Music
Australia Pty Ltd and Others (2006) 156 FCR 380; E-Talk Communications Pty Ltd & Anor v
Universal Music Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] HCATrans 313 (Austl.).
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(c) whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or
avoid the doing of the act, including whether the person complied with
any relevant industry codes of practice.83

Section 101(1A) was intended to “elucidate, not vary” the
84
existing law on authorisation. It was meant to “provide a degree of
85
legislative certainty about liability for authorising infringements.”
Unfortunately, it had the opposite effect by introducing further
86
uncertainty to the already-muddled law on authorisation liability.
The statute lists three factors to inform a court when
determining whether an inference may be drawn that a defendant has
authorised an infringement by a third party. However, the statute fails
to clarify the legal threshold that must be attained to justify the
inference of authorisation. Section 101(1A) does not mention any of
the important legal thresholds for imposing authorisation liability
from prior case law, such as “grant or purport to grant the right,” or to
“sanction, approve, and/or countenance.” The statute’s factors are
clearly correlated to the analysis of the minority judgment of Gibbs, J,
in Moorhouse. However the statute does not account for the very
different reasoning of the majority judgment of Jacobs, J, and
McTiernan, ACJ, in Moorhouse based on permission and invitation.
This created a dilemma for courts attempting to reconcile the case law
87
with Section101(1)(A).
Second, the statute’s three factors are neither exclusive, nor
88
required. The non-exclusivity allows courts the freedom to consider
unique factual circumstances that could not be anticipated in advance
89
when drafting the statute. Other matters, such as those considered in
cases prior to the amendments in 2001 may still be taken into
90
account. For example, the degree of knowledge of the alleged
authoriser might be considered. While this is necessary for flexibility

83. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1A) (Austl.); see also, s 36(1A) (regarding other
types of works) (emphasis added).
84. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶415 (citing Universal Music Australia Pty
Ltd and Others v Sharman License Holdings Ltd and Others (2005) 65 IPR 289, 402).
85. Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Bill 1999 (Cth) (Austl.), Explanatory
Memorandum at 54 http://bit.do/CopyrightAmendment.
86. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.22 (Professor Lindsay asserts that the partial
codification “conspicuously failed” to clarify the law.); see also Giblin, Uncertainties, supra
note 55, at 156.
87. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.10.
88. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 733-34.
89. Id. at 742.
90. See Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 156 (citing Cooper v Universal Music
Australia Pty Ltd and Others (2006) 156 FCR 380).
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to respond to new types of authorising conduct, it comes at the cost of
certainty and predictability.
The lower court judgments in iiNet embody the confusion
regarding the interplay between the case law and Section 101(1)(A).
The trial judge, Cowdroy J, performed an exhaustive analysis of
Moorhouse and subsequent authorisation case precedents to conclude
91
that iiNet had not authorised the infringements. Only after already
reaching this conclusion against authorisation did Cowdroy, J,
consider the statutory factors. The trial judge apparently believed the
mandatory consideration of the three statutory criteria did little to
92
vary the case law.
This after-the-fact consideration of Section
101(1)(A) was rejected in all three judgments of the Full Federal
93
Court. In contrast, on appeal Emmett, J, gave minimal consideration
to the case law and cited no case precedents for his conclusion on
authorisation liability. Emmett, J, focused his analysis almost entirely
94
on Section 101(1)(A).
Third, the three factors are not requirements for a finding of
authorisation, but only matters that must be considered. Thus,
authorisation liability arguably may attach even in the absence of one
95
of the factors. In this regard, the statute is significantly at odds with
the case law regarding the requisite “power to prevent” infringements.
The statutory language is “(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s
power to prevent the doing of the act concerned.”96 Commentators
have suggested that the phrase “if any” indicates the liability could
attach even in the absence of any power to prevent the infringing
97
acts. This is contrary to the case law holding that a power to prevent
(and perhaps even a direct power to prevent) is a prima facie element
98
of an authorisation claim based on indifference.
Finally, authorisation liability cases necessarily involve issues of
fact, whether one is applying the case precedents or the statutory
factors. Each of the mandatory factors involves matters of degree,
particularly the question of the “reasonable steps” an alleged
91. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶357-415.
92. Id. at ¶415-16.
93. IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 315 (Emmett, J); 374-80 (Jagot, J);
442 (Nicholas, J).
94. Id. at 325-34 (Emmett, J).
95. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 734.
96. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) S. 101(1A) (Austl.).
97. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 734; Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at
158.
98. Moorhouse, supra note 60, at 12 (citing ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66, at
497-98, 503.)
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authoriser might take. Thus, proper application of the statute requires
a balancing and weighing of the respective factors that may vary
considerably on the particular facts of each case.
C. Disharmony in the Trial and Appellate Court in iiNet
Given the splintered nature of authorisation case precedents and
the unsettled interpretations regarding the partial codification in
Section 101(1)(A), it is perhaps unsurprising that iiNet the case
produced four conflicting judgments at the trial court and on appeal.
Each of these judgments applied its own distinctive analysis and
reasoning for the decision reached, leaving a wide range of issues for
the High Court to resolve.
In the trial court, Cowdroy, J, applied the reasoning of Gibbs, J,
in Moorhouse. The trial judge concluded that having control over the
true “means of infringement” was the “fundamental and foundational
99
element” for establishing authorisation liability. Since iiNet had no
control over the BitTorrent software or the infringing acts that iiNet
subscribers committed using BitTorrent, iiNet had not authorised the
infringements. Cowdroy, J, only considered the factors mandated in
Section 101(1A) after making a finding that iiNet had not authorised
100
the infringement.
This approach was rejected by all three
101
judgments in the Full Federal Court.
The Full Federal Court dismissed the movie studios’ appeal in a
102
2-1 decision.
Emmett, J, considered that iiNet’s inaction was
103
“capable of constituting at least tacit approval.” However, he held
that implementing a graduated response program was not a reasonable
step due to deficiencies in the AFACT Notices, the costs involved,
and the liability risks to iiNet if it wrongfully terminated a
104
subscriber.
The Emmett judgment is most notable for its
speculative attempt to describe the contours of a graduated response
program that hypothetically could be considered a “reasonable step”
under Section 101(1)(A). Emmett, J, ruled that ISP action would only
be required when the ISP had received unequivocal and cogent
evidence of the primary infringements, reimbursement of the ISPs
costs to identify and warn subscribers, and indemnification of the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT,

supra note 23, at ¶382.
Id. at ¶416.
See supra note 93.
IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20.
Id. at 326 (Emmett, J).
Id. at 331-34.
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105

ISP’s potential liabilities. Nicholas, J, also held that iiNet had not
authorised the primary infringements principally because it was
reasonable for iiNet to not take action against its subscribers given
defects in the AFACT notices, the implementation costs for ISPs and
106
the liability risks involved.
In contrast, Jagot, J, held that iiNet had authorised the
infringements by its indifference and inaction. The AFACT notices
were sufficiently detailed and credible to require iiNet to exercise its
technical and contractual power to control the ongoing relationship
107
with its subscribers. In adopting an attitude that it had no obligation
to act upon the AFACT notices, iiNet went beyond mere indifference
108
to tacit approval of the infringements of its subscribers.
III. THE HIGH COURT’S DECISION IN IINET
The iiNet case was the first authorisation liability case to reach
109
the High Court since Moorhouse in 1975. Moreover, iiNet was the
first case to be considered by the highest-level court in a national
legal system in which an ISP faced secondary liability for the primary
110
copyright infringements of its subscribers.
When the Australian
High Court decided Moorhouse, it could not have imagined the highspeed personal computers and massive digital storage devices that
today make it possible to reproduce exact copies of copyrighted
works easily, instantly, and cheaply. Nor could they have envisioned
the fast broadband networks and peer-to-peer software that allows
immediate, global distribution of infringing works. The iiNet case
gave the High Court the opportunity to review Moorhouse in light of
the impressive digital advances of the intervening thirty-seven years.
In addition, the High Court had its first opportunity to interpret the
provisions of Section 101(1A) since they were added to the Copyright
Act in 2001.
All five members of the High Court ruled that iiNet’s
indifference did not constitute authorisation of the primary
infringements. The High Court issued two judgments. The majority
judgment of French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel, JJ (hereinafter, the
“French judgment”) applied the “grant or purport to grant” standard

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 333, 343.
IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 460-61 (Nicholas, J).
Id. at 385-87, 392 (Jagot, J).
Id. at 395-97.
Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 729.
Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.1.
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from Atkin, LJ, in Falcon.
The judgment focused on the statutory
factors in Section 101(1A). It emphasized that iiNet’s power to
prevent infringing acts was limited and indirect. iiNet’s Customer
Relationship Agreement (CRA) had expressly restricted use of its
services to legal uses. Consequently, the French judgment held that
iiNet subscribers could not possibly infer from iiNet’s indifference
that iiNet had granted them the right to commit the primary
112
infringements. Further, the French judgment held that authorization
could not be inferred from iiNet’s indifference because it would not
be a reasonable step for iiNet to implement the graduated response
scheme sought by the studios. iiNet merely made an assessment of the
costs, liability risks and effectiveness of the scheme in light of the
deficient information in the AFACT notices and determined that it
113
was unreasonable to do so.
The full statutory analysis of the French judgment was only
briefly addressed in the minority judgment of Gummow and Hayne,
JJ (hereinafter, the “Gummow judgment”). The Gummow judgment
confirmed the French judgment’s analysis that applied the “grant or
purport to grant” test, and confirmed the conclusion that iiNet had not
authorised the infringements. First, however, the Gummow judgment
explored other theories for secondary liability. The judgment
reviewed general principles of tort law related to liability for
114
omissions and failing to act.
The Gummow judgment gave two
reasons for refusing to impose a broad duty of care (which it
compared to negligence) which would require ISPs to act
affirmatively to prevent primary infringements by subscribers. First,
such a duty would be so broad that it would create an uncertain legal
115
standard for ISP operations.
Second, it would provide copyright
owners with a remedy that was not available to them if they had sued
116
the primary infringers directly. The Gummow judgment found that
the only practical course of action available to iiNet to prevent the
acts of primary infringement was to terminate all further Internet uses
by the subscriber. The Gummow judgment concluded that it was not
unreasonable for iiNet to be indifferent to the incomplete allegations
117
contained in the AFACT notices.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra

note 26, at 61.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Id.
IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 90.
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The “Sanction, Approve, Countenance” Standard
Discredited

The High Court’s ruling significantly reduced the uncertainty
and the risk of authorisation liability for ISPs and other
intermediaries. The Court turned back the clock to 1926 by applying
the narrower definition of authorisation stated by Atkin, LJ, in Falcon
v Famous Players: “authorise” means to “grant or purport to grant to
118
a third person the right to do the act complained of.” This holding
harmonizes Australian secondary liability law with the law in the
United Kingdom and that in Canada, each of which had criticized the
119
expansive reasoning in Moorhouse.
Both judgments in the High Court rejected the use of the
“sanction, approve, countenance” standard. In response to the
contention that iiNet’s inaction amounted to “countenancing” of the
infringements—and thus, authorisation—the French judgment stated:
“Countenance” is a long-established English word which, unsurprisingly,
has numerous forms and a number of meanings which encompass
expressing support, including moral support or encouragement. In both the
United Kingdom and Canada, it has been observed that some of the
meanings of “countenance” are not co-extensive with “authorise.” Such
meanings are remote from the reality of authorisation which the statute
contemplates. The argument highlights the danger in placing reliance on
one of the synonyms for “authorise” to be found in a dictionary.120

The Gummow judgment also criticized the “sanction, approve,
countenance” approach. The judgment declared that it would be
wrong to take the one element of the test—countenance—then seek
the broadest definition of that element to expand the “core notion of
121
‘authorise.’”
Rejecting the studios’ claim that iiNet’s indifference
amounted to authorisation, the Gummow judgment declared: “The
progression . . . from the evidence, to “indifference,” to
122
“countenancing,” and so to “authorisation” is too long a march.”
The abandonment of Moorhouse’s application of the “sanction,
approve, countenance” standard appears to have surprised some legal
commentators who anticipated a close fact-based decision interpreting
118. Falcon v Famous Players Film Co (1926) 2 KB 474, 499 (UK) (Atkin, LJ).
119. See CBS Inc v Ames Records & Tapes Ltd [1982] Ch 91 at 109 (UK); CBS Songs
Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] AC 1013 at 1059-1060 (UK); CCH Canadian
Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 1 SCR 339 (Can.).
120. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 68.
121. Id. at 84.
122. Id. at 89.
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Moorhouse in light of the statutory amendments in Section
123
101(1A).
The High Court’s “grant or purport to grant” standard
makes it exceedingly difficult to infer authorisation merely from the
indifference of an Internet intermediary in a continuing relationship
with its users or subscribers. Except in unusual cases, the
intermediary will need to engage some affirmative conduct, such as
active promotion or encouragement from which the primary infringer
124
could infer a grant of a right to infringe. The Gummow judgment
also noted the stark contrast between the “indifference” referenced in
Moorhouse and the intentional “inducement and encouragement”
125
required by the U.S. Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster.
B. The Primacy of Section 101(1)(A) Factors
Under both High Court judgments the first obligation is to
examine the statutory factors in Section 101(1A) to determine
whether they support an inference of authorisation when applying the
“grant or purport to grant” threshold. In rejecting the use of dictionary
definitions for “authorisation,” the French judgment stated:
Whilst resort to such meanings may have been necessary in the past,
attention is now directed in the first place to s 101(1A). That provision is
intended to inform the drawing of an inference of authorisation by
reference to the facts and circumstances there identified, and recourse
must be had to it. That is an express requirement.126

1. Technical and
Infringements

Contractual

Power

to

Prevent

With regard to the first statutory factor—the power to prevent
acts of infringement—both High Court judgments found iiNet’s
powers to be limited and indirect. The French judgment emphasized
the utter lack of technical control that iiNet had over any aspect of the
BitTorrent system, protocol, or the BitTorrent client. Nor did iiNet
have any control over the uses its subscribers would make of
BitTorrent, and could not remove, filter, or block any infringing
123. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 725-26. (Two leading commentators
anticipated that the High Court would interpret Moorhouse and Section 101(1A) to require iiNet
to merely forward warning notices as a reasonable step, but not to implement a graduate
response program leading to suspension or termination of Internet service.).
124. Lindsay, supra note 59, at 53.14. (Inducement liability in the U.S. requires active
steps taken to encourgage direct infringement, and depends upon purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct. MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).).
125. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 85; MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S.
913, 936-37 (2005).
126. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 68.
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content its subscribers chose to access or store. Despite iiNet’s
provision of technology to access the Internet, it had “no direct
technical power at its disposal to prevent a customer from using the
BitTorrent system to download appellants’ films to that customer’s
127
computer . . . .”
In this regard, the French judgment echoed the
128
conclusions of Cowdroy, J, in the trial court.
With regard to iiNet’s contractual power over its subscribers, the
High Court directly applied the narrower definition of authorisation:
“to grant or purport to grant a right.” By giving its customers access
to the Internet, it had provided them with the power to use the
Internet. However this power could be used for both infringing and
non-infringing purposes. Under the terms of its CRA iiNet prohibited
use of its service to “commit an offence or to infringe another
person’s rights; . . . for illegal purpose or practices; . . . or allow
anybody else to do so.” The High Court found that the CRA gave
express, formal and positive disapproval of using the Internet for
infringing purposes, negating any possibility that iiNet had granted its
129
subscribers any right to infringe.
This language echoed the U.K.
130
decision in CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad, which held that by selling
tape recording devices to consumers, the seller “conferred on the
purchaser the power to copy but did not grant or purport to grant a
131
right to copy.”
The High Court’s assessment of iiNet’s power to prevent the
infringing acts is starkly different from the judgments in the Full
Federal Court. Each of the three appellate judgments had found that
iiNet had both a technical power over its service and contractual
power under the CRA that it could use to prevent the
132
infringements.
The appellate judgments focused on iiNet’s power
over its users, by limiting the extent of their access to Internet. iiNet
could use its technical power to slow, suspend or terminate a user’s
service. Further, in the CRA iiNet’s users had granted iiNet
contractual powers to do so if they had used the iiNet service to
infringe.
In contrast, the High Court and the trial judge focused on the
uses that subscribers made of iiNet’s Internet service. Like the trial
judge, the French judgment found iiNet had no technical power to
127. Id. at 68, 70 (French, J); Id. at 88 (Gummow, J).
128. IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶407-09.
129. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 68.
130. CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc (1988) AC 1013 (UK).
131. Id. at 1054.
132. IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 327, 329 (Emmett, J), at 381, 383
(Jagot, J), and at 449 (Nicholas, J).
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prevent the infringing acts. It could only prevent the infringing acts
by an indirect and limited contractual power to terminate the service
of the user in its entirety. The Gummow judgment observed that
Section 101(1A) begins with identification of an act of primary
infringement, and considers whether a defendant has authorised “that
134
act” of primary infringement.
The Gummow judgment ruled that
iiNet lacked any power over the uses that subscribers would make of
iiNet facilities to access the BitTorrent software to make infringing
copies of the studios’ films.
2. Direct vs. Indirect Power to Prevent
The French judgment further constrains authorisation liability by
construing Section 101(1A)(a) to require that an alleged authoriser
have a power to prevent primary infringements:
An alleged authoriser must have a power to prevent the primary
infringements. Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Jain,
Tape Manufacturers, Kazaa and Cooper all confirm that there must be
such a power to prevent. So much had been recognised earlier, in any
event, in Adelaide Corporation and Moorhouse.135

Further, the French judgment drew a distinction between direct and
indirect power to prevent infringement. Citing Adelaide Corporation,
the French judgment required a direct power to prevent a specific act
of infringement, and rather than an indirect power that could halt the
136
infringements only by terminating an entire relationship.
With
regard to BitTorrent use, iiNet was held to have no direct technical
137
power over the uses its subscribers made of the iiNet service.
Regarding iiNet’s contractual power, the French judgment
determined that iiNet had only an indirect power because it could
prevent the primary infringements only by terminating the entire
relationship.138 In other words, iiNet’s only power was over the
133. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 67; IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra
note 23, at ¶407-09.
134. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 87.
135.
Id. at 69 (citing Australasian Performing Right Association Limited v Jain (1990) 26
FCR 53; Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd and Others v The Commonwealth of
Australia (1993) 177 CLR 480; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v Sharman
License Holdings Ltd and Others (2005) 65 IPR 289; Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty
Ltd and Others (2006) 156 FCR 380; ADELAIDE CORPORATION, supra note 66; Moorhouse,,
supra note 60.)
136. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 61.
137. Id. at 67.
138. Id. at 69. (The distinction between direct and indirect power is referenced throughout
the French judgment at 61, 65, 66, 67, 69, and 71, respectively.).
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users—by terminating all services—and not over the particular
infringing uses subscribers would choose to make of any services that
iiNet provided. The Gummow judgment does not discuss this
distinction between direct and indirect power to prevent. However,
the judgment noted that iiNet’s powers were limited to controlling the
contractual relationship. Because iiNet had no control over its
subscribers’ use of BitTorrent, the “only indisputably practical course
of action” to prevent the infringements was to exercise a contractual
power to terminate the service entirely.139
Commentators have discussed whether the existence of an
ongoing commercial relationship gives an alleged authoriser a
continuing degree of control that enables the power to prevent
infringement.140 In past cases involving the sale of devices that have
both infringing and non-infringing uses, the relationship ends upon
completion of the sale. Thus, the manufacturer/seller has no ongoing
control over either the user or the uses to which the purchaser deploys
the device, and thus no power to prevent.141 But when the commercial
transaction involves an ongoing contract to provide a service online—
such as Internet access, or a social media platform—the service
provider can continually tweak the features of the service and the
contractual terms of the user relationship in response to infringing
uses. Thus, iiNet could have modified the terms and conditions of its
CRA to provide that in cases of confirmed infringement, it would
implement a graduated response scheme by sending notices, slowing
service, suspending service, and ultimately terminating service
altogether. This form of control over the user, together with the
specific knowledge of particular infringing acts by identified users,
arguably might be considered a sufficient power to prevent
infringements.
The High Court rejected this argument in iiNet. Two issues
are critical in assessing the proper use of these indirect powers in a
continuing relationship. The first is the ability to control uses of the
service that can prevent infringing acts that fall short of terminating
the service relationship in its entirety.142 Both High Court judgments
found that iiNet was unable to do so, given its limited and indirect
powers. The second issue is whether the indirect power to control
139. Id. at 88.
140. Giblin, Uncertainties, supra note 55, at 156-66; Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80,
at 731-44.
141. Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd and Others v The Commonwealth of
Australia (1993) 177 CLR 480; CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc (1988) AC
1013 (UK).
142. Burrell & Weatherall, supra note 80, at 735.
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users, by limiting or terminating service pursuant to contractual terms
of service, can be exercised without affecting non-infringing uses.143
The Gummow judgment expressed the concern that if iiNet exercised
its indirect power to prevent infringements by terminating accounts,
the subscribers would lose all beneficial non-infringing uses of the
Internet.144 The French judgment emphasized that termination would
be ineffectual because subscribers would merely shift their infringing
activities to other ISPs and/or to other computers.145
3. Reasonable Steps to Prevent or Avoid Infringements
The High Court next analyzed the third statutory factor—
whether iiNet, by failing to act upon the AFACT notices to
commence a graduated response program—had failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the primary infringements. The
High Court held that it would not be a reasonable step for iiNet to
implement a graduated response program.146 Both High Court
judgments expressed concern about the effectiveness of warnings as a
means of ending the primary infringements. The absence of any
required industry protocol binding on all ISPs seriously undermines
the efficacy of any step iiNet might take—even of the rather drastic
147
step of terminating an account entirely.
If iiNet were to terminate
an account, the subscriber could easily create an account with another
148
ISP, or access the Internet by other means.
Thus, termination
merely relocates the infringing activity from one technology provider
to another. The Gummow judgment describes termination of user
accounts as the only indisputably practical solution to prevent the
infringing act.149
The High Court also was troubled over the difficulty of
implementing the graduated response scheme the movie studios
sought. The French judgment observed that iiNet would need to
continually update the investigative exercise that the studios had
undertaken in providing the AFACT notices, yet they had not been
143. Id. at 736-37. See also, Sony Corp. of Am. v Universal City Studios, Inc,. 464 U.S.
417 (1984).
144. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 88; See also, IINET TRIAL
JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶438 (In the trial court Cowdroy, J, also found that terminating
accounts would prevent any beneficial and non-infringing uses of the Internet as well as
infringing uses.).
145. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 70.
146. Id. at 71, 90.
147. Id. at 69-70.
148. Id. at 70, 88.
149. Id. at 88.
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provided with the details of the DTecNet technology or methods.
The AFACT notices “did not approximate the evidence which would
be expected to be filed in civil proceedings alleging copyright
151
infringement.”
The High Court acknowledged the liability risk to
iiNet should the AFACT allegations be proven false. Thus the Court
held that it was not unreasonable for iiNet to refuse to take action
based upon the limited information the movie studios had provided.
The French judgment concluded:
However, the evidence showed that the inactivity was not the indifference
of a company unconcerned with infringements of the appellants’ rights.
Rather, the true inference to be drawn is that iiNet was unwilling to act
because of its assessment of the risks of taking steps based only on the
information in the AFACT notices. Moreover, iiNet’s customers could not
possibly infer from iiNet’s inactivity (if they knew about it) . . . that iiNet
was in a position to grant those customers rights to make the appellants’
films available online.152

One curious aspect of the judgments is that, after stating that the
three statutory factors in Section 101(1A) were mandatory and must
be considered, both judgments failed to specifically discuss the nature
of any relationship existing between iiNet and the primary infringers.
Perhaps the High Court found that the analysis of the issue in the trial
court was dispositive. At trial Cowdroy, J, had recognized the
continuing commercial relationship between iiNet and its users, but
found on the evidence that no sufficient nexus existed between the
153
infringing acts and iiNet’s profitability or commercial interests.
C. Deference to Parliament For Graduated Response
Legislation
Finally, the High Court declared its preference that future issues
regarding graduated response schemes were best resolved by
Parliament through legislation. The French judgment commented:
. . . the concept and the principles of the statutory tort of authorisation of
copyright infringement are not readily suited to enforcing the rights of
copyright owners in respect of widespread infringements occasioned by
peer-to-peer file sharing, as occurs with the BitTorrent system. The
difficulties of enforcement which such infringements pose for copyright
owners have been addressed elsewhere, in constitutional settings different
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 70.
IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 70.
Id. at 70.
IINET TRIAL JUDGMENT, supra note 23, at ¶452.
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from our own, by specially targeted legislative schemes, some of which
incorporate co-operative industry protocols, some of which require
judicial involvement in the termination of internet accounts, and some of
which provide for the sharing of enforcement costs between ISPs and
copyright owners.154

The Gummow judgment concurred:
The history of the Act since 1968 shows that the Parliament is more
responsive to pressures for change to accommodate new circumstances
than in the past. Those pressures are best resolved by legislative processes
rather than by any extreme exercise in statutory interpretation by judicial
decisions.155

Whether to implement a graduated response scheme is a complex
national policy decision about which prominent countries have
reached opposing conclusions.156 Graduated response policies
implicate issues of freedom of expression, privacy, due process,
proportionality and transparency.157 It concerns many public and
private stakeholders whose interests were not represented by the
litigants in the iiNet litigation. The judicial proceedings included no
evidence that would influence the proper design and scope of a
graduated response system, such as reimbursement of costs for ISPs,
the number of notices or warnings to be sent, the scale of the
sanctions to be applied, any appeal rights for sanctioned subscribers,
and the degree and nature of any judicial oversight of a sanctions
regime. It would have been wholly inappropriate for the High Court
to attempt to design or implement a graduated response scheme.158
Whereas legislation can be carefully limited and tailored to
balance a myriad of competing interests, a High Court decision
holding ISPs liable for indifference to specific acts of infringements
on their networks is an extremely blunt instrument. Retaining or
extending application of the highly uncertain “sanction, approve,
countenance” standard from Moorhouse would have significantly
increased the secondary liability risk for ISPs. If the High Court had
held that an affirmative duty arose whenever specific knowledge of
infringing acts was provided, intermediaries would need to
continually monitor the activities of those who use their services. This
154. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 71.
155. Id. at 82.
156. See discussion supra notes 11-13.
157. Bridy, supra note 9, at 37-65.
158. But see, IINET APPELLATE JUDGMENT, supra note 20, at 333, 343 (Emmett, J)
(proposing the contours of a judicially-mandated graduated response regime).
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would be a stifling burden on intermediaries, and would impose
159
substantial and unjustified costs on all legal users of the Internet.
Such a holding also would have dramatically increased the degree of
leverage that copyright owners could assert against ISPs and other
intermediaries in negotiations for a graduated response regime.
Parliament had previously stated a clear preference in the
Copyright Act that copyright owners and intermediaries negotiate the
contours of any affirmative duties for ISPs to educate, warn, suspend
or terminate infringing users in an agreed industry code.160 An
exapnded threat of litigation likely would have distorted the policy
choices to be made when Australian ISPs and major copyright owners
negotiated the contours of a private “voluntary” graduated response
scheme through an industry code. In the absence of such pressures,
ISPs are able to assert the interests of their customers and the public
interest regarding freedom of expression, privacy, due process and
other important values in the negotiations. If the movie studios had
prevailed in iiNet, ISPs would have been under severe pressure to
expediently avoid litigation at the lowest cost. Copyright owners’
private interests would have dominated the negotiations without
regard to the important public policy issues at stake.
Fortunately, in iiNet the High Court unanimously rejected an
expansive interpretation of Australia’s authorisation statutes that
would have created an affirmative duty for ISPs. Under the High
Court’s “grant or purport to grant” standard in iiNet, ISPs can clearly
negate any inference that they are granting a right to infringe
copyright in the contractual Terms of Service governing their
relationship with their subscribers. ISPs presumably will be savvy
enough to avoid any affirmative acts to induce, encourage or actively
incite infringements. Now that iiNet has removed most of the
uncertainty regarding potential authorisation liability grounded upon
indifference, ISPs are free to negotiate for an industry code that will
properly account for important issues such as payment of ISPs’
expenses, the number of notices, degree of sanctions, appeal rights for
accused subscribers, and judicial oversight. Copyright owners will
resist such efforts. Thus it seems likely that Parliament itself will have
to consider the design any graduated response scheme and whether to
enact it into law. 161
159. For example, each month Google now receives more than ninety million requests to
remove items from search results because they allegedly link to infringing copyright material.
See, Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://bit.do/GoogleTransparencyReport. ISPs
would likely be subjected to a similar barrage of allegations.
160. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AH(1) (Austl.).
161. Corinne Reichert, Three-strikes Piracy Code Should be Shelved for a Year: Comms
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF IINET IN AUSTRALIA AND INTERNATIONALLY
The Australian High Court’s unanimous ruling in iiNet clearly
rejects the argument that an ISP may be liable for mere indifference
to copyright infringement online. In iiNet the High Court maintained
the status quo by refusing to be the first court at the highest level of a
national legal system to impose secondary liability on ISPs for mere
indifference to specific acts of primary infringement known to be
occurring on their networks. In this respect, the iiNet decision is
perhaps most important for what it did not do.
Even so, the iiNet decision is quite important for what it did do
for Australian law. The High Court provided a much more certain
legal landscape for Australian ISPs and other intermediaries whose
users may inevitably infringe copyright. By disapproving of the
overly broad “sanction, approve, countenance” standard applied in
Moorhouse the High Court removed a tremendous amount of
uncertainty from Australian law governing authorisation liability. The
High Court clarified the importance of Section 101(1)(A) as the
principal determinant of authorisation liability. Moreover, the High
Court established the legal threshold that the statutory factors must
meet to justify an inference of authorisation—“to grant or purport to
grant” a right to infringe. ISPs will expressly negate any inference
that they are granting a right to infringe in their contractual terms of
service. If ISPs also are careful to avoid affirmative acts that
encourage, promote or condone the primary infringements they will
avoid secondary liability. Finally, both High Court judgments require
a power to prevent the acts of primary infringement, and further, that
the power must be a direct power. Each of these facets of the iiNet
decision reduces the uncertainty and secondary liability risk facing
Australian ISPs.
The iiNet decision does not, however, resolve all of the
outstanding questions regarding authorisation law in Australia. The
decision relies heavily on the statutory factors in Section 101(1)(A),
which were based on Moorhouse and which reflect the broad
interpretation for “authorisation” of Gibbs J. The High Court did not
repudiate Moorhouse, even though both judgments rejected the
reasoning in the case. Instead the High Court distinguished
Alliance CEO, ZDNET (April 4, 2016), http://bit.do/PiracyCodeShelvedForYear; Claire Reilly,
Three Strikes Out: Anti-piracy Scheme Shelved Over ‘prohibitive’ Costs, CNET (February 18,
2016), http://bit.do/PiracyCodeShelvedProhibitedCosts (Copyright owners and ISPs spent
several months in 2015 attempting to negotiate an industry code at the behest of the Australia
Government. The major sticking point was sharing of the costs of the scheme. Negotiations
were abandoned in early 2016.).

32

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 33

Moorhouse on the facts, perhaps to minimize the appearance of the
plain conflict between its reasoning and case law origins of the
statute.162 In adopting the narrow interpretation of “authorisation” in
its “grant or purport to grant” threshold, the High Court introduces
further confusion over the applicability of Moorhouse and subsequent
cases applying its reasoning.163 Lower courts will need to reconcile
these conflicts. Inconsistencies are likely to arise, meaning that the
High Court may well consider these issues again in the foreseeable
future. It is clear, however, that mere indifference to the acts of
primary infringement will not lead to authorisation liability.
The iiNet decision will also have a strong impact internationally.
Two trends in the online world have created the potential for a further
broadening of secondary liability for ISPs. First, the number and
variety of services delivered online by intermediaries is expanding
rapidly. These services feature ongoing contractual relationships that
allow the intermediary continuing control over Internet users through
their terms of service. Second, an expanding range of Internet
surveillance tools allow copyright owners to provide more detailed
information about specific acts of copyright infringement online.
Taken together, the increased control and specific knowledge might
be interpreted broadly to establish an affirmative duty for ISPs to act
to prevent primary infringements on their networks. Australia, with its
embrace of the broad definition of “authorisation” from Moorhouse,
was the ideal forum for such an expansion. The iiNet case thwarted
the potential for this expanded form of secondary liability for ISPs.
The case confirmed the legal boundary for the furthest reach of
secondary liability based on indifference by adopting the “grant or
purport to grant” standard.
With regard to public policy, the High Court’s deference to
Parliament will signal that copyright owners will need to develop
other strategies for engaging ISPs and other intermediaries in the
battle against rampant copyright infringement online. Using the threat
of litigation-based judicial recognition of expanded theories of
secondary liability as a lever to procure negotiated graduated response
schemes appears to have reached its outer limit. Instead, copyright
owners will need to seek legislation establishing new graduated
162. IINET HIGH COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 26, at 86; Lindsay, supra note 59, at
53.20.
163. See, e.g., Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v Cooper and Others (2005)
150 FCR 1; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others v Sharman License Holdings Ltd and
Others (2005) 65 IPR 289; Cooper v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd and Others (2006) 156
FCR 380; E-Talk Communications Pty Ltd & Anor v Universal Music Pty Ltd & Ors [2007]
HCATrans 313 (Austl.).
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response schemes. This will enable broad participation by Internet
users, interest groups and intermediaries in the public debate. This
transparency will ensure that any such regimes are properly limited
and respect essential freedoms and rights as discussed above.
In addition, public scrutiny of any graduated response proposals
during Parliamentary proceedings will allow a searching investigation
of the efficacy of such schemes. A full review of the merits and
deficiencies of graduated response is beyond the scope of this article.
However, Rebecca Giblin’s comprehensive review in 2014 of
graduate responses programs in a number of countries concluded that
graduated response schemes are not effective in achieving their
objectives.164 Consequently, the iiNet case played a large role in
delaying the adoption of an industry code implementing a graduated
response scheme—and perhaps preventing an expensive and
ineffective program from ever being enacted in Australia.
CONCLUSION
In iiNet, Australia’s High Court confirmed that an ISP may
remain indifferent to copyright infringement occurring on its network.
The decision helpfully clarified the law of authorisation liability in
Australia and narrowed Australian law to be consistent with
international norms. By reducing uncertainty and limiting an ISP’s
risk of secondary liability, the judgment also blunted the litigation
pressure that copyright owners were able to exert against ISPs to
agree to a privately negotiated industry code for a graduate response
scheme. The High Court properly allowed the issue of an ISP’s
affirmative duties to assist in the battle against online copyright
infringement to be decided by Parliament with input from all relevant
stakeholders and the public.

164.

Giblin, Graduated Response, supra note 2, at 208-10.

